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LAW(MAKERS) OF THE LAND:
THE DOCTRINE OF TREATY NON-SELF-EXECUTION
David H. Moore*
Responding to Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land:

The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties,

122

HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).

Last year, in Medellin v. Texas,' the Supreme Court handed down
its most important decision on the domestic status of treaties in almost
two hundred years. The Court concluded that the International Court
of Justice's (ICJ) judgment in the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals2 is not binding federal law because the treaties
rendering the judgment compulsory on the international stage are not
self-executing. In the wake of that decision, Professor Carlos Vazquez,
one of the foremost scholars on U.S. treaty law, has argued that one
strain of the doctrine of non-self-execution - which I term the Foster
doctrine - is invalid.3
The Foster doctrine emerges from what
Vazquez considers an improper reading of the Supreme Court's foundational decision in Foster v. Neilson.4 The doctrine assumes that a
treaty may itself, by means short of a clear stipulation that the treaty
requires legislative implementation, indicate that it is domestically unenforceable.5 Vazquez's assault on this doctrine is full bodied. He argues that this brand of non-self-execution is inconsistent with the Constitution, long-standing precedent, other manifestations of the non-selfexecution doctrine, and the best reading of Medellin.

Professor, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School; Visiting Professor,
George Washington University Law School. I wish to thank Duncan Hollis and Carlos Vazquez
for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. This essay is dedicated to Talmage Theodore
Moore.
1 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
2 (Mex v. U.S.), 2004 LC.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
3 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).
4 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (I Pet.)

51 (1833). Although I label the target of Vazquez's article the Foster doctrine, I recognize
that Vazquez does not entirely reject the Foster decision. He expressly "conclude[s] that it is too
late to reject Foster-type non-self-execution entirely," Vazquez, supra note 3, at 61o, but he rejects
the broader reading of Foster that gives rise to the Foster brand of non-self-execution this essay
defends.
5 Vazquez, supra note 3, at 602. Although Medellin has invigorated debate on the question,
this essay assumes that a treaty that is non-self-executing under the Foster doctrine is not judicially enforceable but might nonetheless qualify in some sense as domestic law.
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This essay challenges each assertion. Each stems from a focus on
treaties' status as law of the land under the Supremacy Clause. But
the propriety of the Foster doctrine is defined largely by the constitutional scope and allocation of lawmaking authority. Focusing on the
authority of the lawmakers of the land rather than on treaties' status
as law of the land, this essay concludes that the Foster brand of nonself-execution is supported by the Constitution, consistent with longstanding precedent, a coherent part of the non-self-execution doctrine,
and endorsed by Medellin.
I. CONSTITUTION

VAzquez's rejection of the Foster doctrine, like so many challenges
to the doctrine of non-self-execution, is driven by asserted implications
of the Supremacy Clause.6 In his view, the Supremacy Clause renders
treaties, like statutes and the Constitution, presumptively enforceable
in U.S. courts.' From a variety of constitutional perspectives, however, it appears that the Supremacy Clause is not the primary guidepost for assessing the validity of the Foster doctrine.
Under the traditional purposive account, which Vazquez endorses,
the Supremacy Clause was adopted to restrict the sort of subnational
treaty noncompliance that plagued the country during the period of
Confederation." The Clause was not designed to address the scope of
the federal treatymakers' authority to control the domestic implementation of treaty duties. 9 Of course, the text of the Clause, like the text
of any law, may reach further than its original or primary target.10
But it is worth noting that the Supremacy Clause's text itself highlights state actors, declaring that "the Judges in every State shall be
bound [by treaties], any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."" This is not to suggest that
the Supremacy Clause lacks any import for federal judges but that its

6 See also Carlos M. Vazquez, Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman: Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAw STORIES 151, 151 (John E. Noyes et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Vazquez, Foster and Percheman].("Some modern scholars and lower courts appear to view 'non-self-execution' as the rule and the Supremacy Clause as the exception.").
7 Vazquez, supra note 3, at 602, 6o6.
8 Id. at 605, 617-19, 621, 642; see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of SelfExecuting Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 695, 698-99 (1995) [hereinafter Vazquez, Four Doctrines].
9 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 446-49 (2000).

10 See Vazquez, supra note 3, at 676-77.
11 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Vazquez's reading of the Clause omits the "state" qualifier. See,

e.g., Vazquez, supra note 3, at 614 ("The bare text of [the Supremacy C]lause establishes that treaties are to be given effect by judges.").
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textual focus remains on limiting the discretion of judges, particularly
state judges, not of treatymakers.12
Like the text, the context and conventional understanding of the
Supremacy Clause do not declare treaties to be the supreme law of the
land as to all government actors. To the extent that treaties bind the
President (an unsettled proposition), it apparently took the Take Care
Clause,1 3 not the Supremacy Clause alone, to achieve that result.
Moreover, none would assert that those to whom the Constitution assigns the authority to amend the document cannot eliminate the treaty
power altogether notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause. Similarly,
few would argue that the authority of Congress and the President to
enact law is somehow constrained by treaties' status as supreme law of
the land. If the Supremacy Clause does not address the effect of
treatymaking on the authority of these other constitutional lawmakers,
it is not apparent why it would address the authority of treatymakers.
Indeed, it would seem odd to assume that the supreme status of treaties does not limit the authority of potentially competing lawmakers
but does limit the power of the treatymakers themselves. In light of
the Constitution's carefully crafted checks and balances, one might expect the ability of one set of lawmakers to override the lawmaking of
another set to receive more explicit treatment than the discretion of
any given set of lawmakers to limit the exercise of its own authority.
In practice, the Supremacy Clause has not been invoked to restrict
lawmakers' own authority to create something less than what the
Supremacy Clause allows. Those authorized to amend the Constitution were able to adopt a Bill of Rights applicable only to the federal
government, notwithstanding the fact that the Supremacy Clause
renders the Constitution the supreme law of the land and binding on
the states. Similarly, Congress and the President have been able to enact statutes that expressly eschew preemption of state law,14 that authorize states to opt out of federal requirements,'5 that settle tribal
claims and contain provisions that become effective only on the completion of certain conditions precedent by administrative, tribal, and
judicial actors,' 6 and that do not impose binding obligations.'7 The
12 Cf Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV 2154, 2209-10 (1999).

13 U.S.

CONST. art. II, §3.

14 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(a)(2)

(2000) (delineating areas of state authority regarding trans-

poration that Congress did not intend to restrict).
15See 15 U.S.C. § 260a (2006) (governing daylight savings).
16 See, e. g., Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. io-297, § IO, 122
Stat. 2975, 2983 (2008).

17See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requesting that the President issue an annual proclamation
to designate "February as American Heart Month"); see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, NonSelf-Execution and the Supreme Law of the Land 6-7 (Sept. 26, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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Supremacy Clause has not prevented these exercises of constitutional
authority.'8
VAzquez agrees that the Supremacy Clause does not prohibit lawmakers from adopting something less than the Clause allows to the extent he argues that treatymakers can create a non-self-executing treaty
by providing a clear statement of that intent or by negotiating and
ratifying an instrument that is sufficiently vague, commits the parties
to make "best efforts," or requires the United States to take actions
constitutionally committed to federal actors other than the treatymakers.' 9 The Supremacy Clause does not limit the treatymakers' discretion to exercise their authority in these ways to produce a treaty that
does not qualify for judicially enforceable, preemptive effect. If the
Supremacy Clause did, the courts arguably should strike treaties that
require action constitutionally committed to other federal actors.
However, the accepted wisdom is that such treaties are merely nonself-executing. 20 One might respond that other features of the Constitution - limitations on the lawmaking discretion of federal courts and
assignments of authority to specific sets of actors - compel this
unique result for treaties that are vague or require action by other actors. But these same constitutional considerations - vesting of
treatymaking, foreign affairs, and lawmaking authority in the political
branches - support characterization of other treaties as non-selfexecuting as well.
All this suggests that attempting to answer the self-execution question by placing primary emphasis on the Supremacy Clause is misguided. The more relevant constitutional provisions are those that address lawmaking authority, not those that address the preemptive
nature of the ultimate law; the focus is more appropriately on the authority of the lawmakers of the land than on the impact of the law of
the land.
When one turns to constitutional provisions addressing federal
power, one discovers the familiar effort to expand federal lawmaking
and foreign affairs authority. Among other things, treatymaking au18 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 447 & n.2I6. Vazquez challenges the argument
that treatymakers possess unilateral authority to tailor domestic implementation because the enactors of statutes possess such authority. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 676. In his view, the analogy
between treaties and statutes fails because "[s]tatutes are made solely by the U.S. lawmakers"
while treaties require the agreement of another state. Id. His argument is undercut, however, by
his conclusion that "the treaty power includes a limited power to make domestic law that is related to, but not strictly part of, the treaty." Id. at 683.
19 See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 3, at 6og, 630-31, 643, 694. Vazquez thus recognizes fairly
broad authority to tailor domestic consequences in treatymaking, though not as broad as the Foster doctrine contemplates.
20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ iII cmt. i reporters' note 6 (1987).
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thority is vested in the President and a supermajority of the Senate,
while state treatymaking is prohibited. The President is authorized to
recognize foreign governments, and the President and Congress empowered to regulate foreign commerce. As this textual evidence suggests and history confirms, the Constitution expands federal lawmaking and foreign affairs authority and vests the political branches with
discretion in exercising that authority. This authority is subject to
limitations, including procedures through which the authority must be
exercised. But nowhere does the Constitution suggest that federal
lawmakers may not decide to exercise this delegated authority less aggressively than the Supremacy Clause permits. 2 1 More specifically,
there is no suggestion, as Vizquez acknowledges, that in empowering
federal actors the Constitution installed a binary switch whereby the
treatymakers must either decide to exercise their treaty authority and
require judicial preemption of state law or forego that exercise to avoid
preemption and judicial enforcement.22
II. PRECEDENT
Foster and Percheman support this conclusion. VAzquez reads
Percheman as repudiating Foster to the extent Foster permitted a
treaty itself to support non-self-execution in the absence of a clear
stipulation that the treaty's obligations were directed to the political
branches. 23 However, the two opinions are better read as preserving a
properly understood Foster brand of non-self-execution. 2 4
Before turning to Percheman to undercut the Foster doctrine, VAzquez seeks to minimize Foster's non-self-execution holding as an alternative holding. 25 It appears, however, both that Foster's non-selfexecution holding was the primary holding and, more importantly, that
the non-self-execution holding was significantly colored by what was
in fact the alternative ground on which the Court might have relied:
the conclusion that the treaty at issue did not apply to the land whose
ownership was disputed.26 The Court in Foster could have resolved
21 Cf Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the
(2006) (recognizing executive discretion to invoke
something less than the full treaty power in order to protect state interests).
22 Cf Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 405-09 (arguing that the power to refuse to consent to treaties includes the power to adopt non-self-executing ones).
23 See Vazquez, supra note 3, at 644 45.
24 For a helpful summary of the background to and the Court's analysis in Foster and Percheman, see Vazquez, Foster and Percheman,supra note 6.
25 Vazquez, supra note 3, at 6oi, 628, 632-33; see also Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8,
Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1389-90

at 702 n.35.
26 But cf Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511, 516-22 (1838) (describing Foster as deciding that

the land in question was not in Spanish control at the time Spain and the United States entered
the relevant treaty); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 710-ii (1832) (same); Tho-
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the case on this alternative ground, concluding simply that the treaty
with Spain on which the petitioner based his land claim did not apply
because the land in question had been transferred to the United States
before the treaty with Spain was contracted.
Whether in fact that land had been previously ceded to France and
from France to the United States such that it was not the subject of
the treaty with Spain was a matter of longstanding debate between the
United States and Spain. The Court thought it "not improbable that"
the treaty was drafted to avoid undermining either sovereign's
stance.27 Under these circumstances, the Court would be bound to enforce the U.S. position inasmuch as "[t]he judiciary is not that department of the government, to which the assertion of [the United States's

foreign policy] interests against foreign powers is confided; and [inasmuch as] its duty commonly is to decide upon individual rights, according to those principles which the political departments of the nation have established." 28
Through various acts, Congress had
expressed its position that the land in question was U.S. territory prior
to the treaty with Spain. 2 9 In light of the political branches' position,
the Court indicated that it "would" construe the treaty as inapplicable
to the land claimed on the understanding that the land had previously
been ceded to the United States.3 0 But the Court did not so hold.
Chief Justice Marshall noted that Spain's instrument of ratification
might support a different construction of the treaty under which petitioner's land would have been ceded by the treaty, but only the Chief
Justice and one other Justice were inclined to adopt that position.3 1
The Court avoided fracturing over the definitive interpretation of
the treaty - a decision with foreign affairs implications - by concluding that the relevant provision of the treaty was non-selfexecuting. That conclusion was ostensibly based on the language of
the treaty providing that Spanish grants "shall be ratified and con-

mas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International
Law, 235 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303, 374-75 (1992) (arguing that Foster'snon-self-execution finding resulted

from the political branches' position that the treaty with Spain did not cover the land in question); David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court
Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 20, 83-85
(2006) (characterizing Foster's non-self-execution discussion as dicta).
27 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 311 (1829), overruled in part by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
28 Id. at 307.
29 See id. at 307-09.
3o Id. at 312.
31 Id. at 312-14.
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firmed." 3 2 As the Court explained, notwithstanding the "different
principle" incorporated in the Constitution by which treaties have the
same effect as legislation, not all treaties are immediately enforceable
in U.S. courts.3 3 When a treaty "import[s] a contract, when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department." 34 The obligation to
ratify and to confirm Spanish grants used the "language of contract"
and thus called for legislative enactment.3 1 Congress apparently understood the treaty to require future legislative acts as well, for Congress authorized boards of commissioners and federal courts to review
land claims covered by the treaty.3 6 Consequently, the Court could
not, absent implementing legislation, apply the treaty "to disregard the
existing laws on the subject."37
While Vazquez seeks to reduce Foster to a hasty decision based
solely on the language of the treaty itself, much more was at issue in
the self-execution decision than the treaty language. Foster engaged in
a broader separation of powers analysis of which the treaty language
was one part. The issue in Foster was one with significant foreign policy implications, and the Court recognized that such decisions were
within the discretion of the political branches. Although the political
branches had staked out a position, the diplomatic dispute was live,
and the Court left enforcement of that position to the political process,
consistent with the political branches' understanding that the treaty
was to be implemented legislatively.
The Foster doctrine, properly understood, thus permits treatymakers to adopt something short of a self-executing treaty and looks to separation of powers considerations beyond the treaty's language in deciding whether they have. These separation of powers considerations
may be present even when a treaty does not address domestic implementation, avoiding the sort of snark hunt that Vazquez and the Medellin dissent bemoan and that might result if the treaty's terms were
the sole consideration.38
Percheman is consistent with this broader self-execution analysis.
True, the Percheman Court highlighted the different language employed by the Spanish version of the treaty, language that did not re32 Id. at 310 (quoting Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of
America and His Catholic Majesty (Adams-Onis Treaty), U.S.-Spain, art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat.
252).

33

Id. at 314.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 315.
36

See id.

37 Id.

38 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1381 (2008) (Breyer,
note 3, at 607, 629, 633-38, 668-69.

J.,

dissenting); Vazquez, supra
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flect a need for future legislative acts, and concluded that the English
version, though using "the words of contract" and "stipulating for some
future legislative act," could accommodate immediate judicial enforcement.3 9 Focusing exclusively on this difference in language,
VAzquez argues that Percheman adopted a clear statement rule for
non-self-execution stipulations.
That is, VAzquez concludes that
Percheman requires that treaties "insist" on or "stipulate" for non-selfexecution and that these terms mandate a clear statement. 40 But the
language differential was not the only basis for interpreting the treaty
differently in Percheman.41
The separation of powers considerations that contributed to a finding of non-self-execution in Foster pointed in the opposite direction in
Percheman.42 It was undisputed that the treaty with Spain applied to
the land claimed by Percheman. Consequently, there was no risk of
complicating U.S. foreign relations through adjudication of Percheman's claim. Nor, the Court found, was there any evidence that the
political branches wished to preserve an opportunity to legislate on the
matter. International law already secured the grants made to individuals like Percheman in the ceded territories. As the security of the
grants "would have been complete without the [treaty with Spain], the
United States could have no motive for insisting on the interposition of
government in order to give validity to titles which, according to the
usages of the civilized world, were already valid." 43 Finally, Congress
had confirmed its intent to secure the grants by establishing procedures for confirming claims to land covered by the treaty, including
authorizing the district courts to resolve claims like Percheman's.44 As
a result, Percheman came out differently, not solely because of newly
discovered language, though that is an easy point of distinction, but
because (i) there was no threat to U.S. foreign relations or to the political branches' foreign affairs discretion in litigating the treaty claim;
(2) there was reason to believe that the treatymakers did not intend to
accommodate future legislative discretion in implementing the treaty;
39

United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (I Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
40 Vaizquez, supra note 3, at 645.
41 The Court does say that awareness of the Spanish version "would have produced [in Foster]
the construction" adopted in Percheman. Percheman, 32 U.S. at 89. Aside from being dictum,
this statement does not clearly indicate that the Court would have held the treaty to be selfexecuting notwithstanding the other considerations at play. Perhaps the statement reflects Chief
Justice Marshall's inclination, reflected in Foster, to find for the land claimants. See Foster, 27
U.S. at 313. But cf Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1362 (defending reliance on treaty language in assessing self-execution by noting that "Chief Justice Marshall found the language" differential to be
dispositive in Foster and Perchenan).
42 See Buergenthal, supra note 26, at 375.
43 Percheman,32 U.S. at 88-89; see also id. at 86-87.
44 See id. at 89-95.
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and, (3) even if they had, Congress had effectively executed the treaty
by providing means to achieve claim confirmation. 45
Rather than narrowing Foster, Percheman thus supports a selfexecution analysis that looks to separation of powers notions to preserve the intent and authority of the political branches of the federal
government.
III. QUARTERING THE NON-SELF-EXECUTION DOCTRINE

So understood, the Foster brand of non-self-execution coheres with
other iterations of the non-self-execution doctrine. VAzquez undoubtedly advanced understanding of treaty execution by identifying various doctrines of self-execution. 46 However, the several doctrines paradigm arguably goes too far to the extent it supports the actual
quartering of the Foster doctrine.
VAzquez strikes at Foster non-self-execution on the ground that it
treats treaties differently than their Supremacy Clause companions, the
Constitution and statutes. His rationale is faulty for three reasons.
First, it is not clear that the Supremacy Clause requires equal treatment of the three sources of law it describes. As VAzquez necessarily
concedes, the Supremacy Clause does not give the Constitution, laws,
and treaties the same status. 47 The Constitution is "more supreme,"
perhaps given its role as the organic document giving rise to, defining
the creation of, and, at least as to statutes, delineating the content of
the other forms of law.
Just as the Constitution is different from statutes and treaties, treaties are different from the Constitution and statutes. Treaties serve an
external role that the Constitution and statutes do not. 48 Treaties give
rise to obligations to and from coequal sovereigns. At the same time,
the Constitution assigns treaties a domestic function. As discussed
above, the Constitution does not require that treatymakers invariably
exercise their authority to create preemptive judicially enforceable federal law in tandem with their authority to create external obligations.
Given treaties' dual character, it is not clear that a doctrine that inquires into whether the external exercise of authority is to be given the
45 See also United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 17o-104, 734-36, 742-44 (1832) (ad-

dressing claims to land clearly covered by the U.S.-Spain treaty and distinguishing Foster on the
ground that Foster was based on the treaty itself, while statutory directives controlled the disposition in Arredondo).
46 See Vazquez, Four Doctrines,supra note 8.
47 See Vazquez, supra note 3, at 611.
48 The dual nature of treaties was prominently acknowledged in Medellin. See Medellin v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) ("This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that - while they constitute international law commitments - do not by themselves function as binding federal law."); see also id.
at 1357.
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domestic effect the Supremacy Clause permits is inconsistent with the
pairing of treaties with statutes and the Constitution. Indeed, one
might argue that rejection of such a doctrine improperly treats treaties
as if they were the same as the Constitution and statutes.
Second, even if the Supremacy Clause could be read to require
equivalent treatment notwithstanding the uniqueness of treaties, it is
not clear that the Foster doctrine necessarily results in unequal treatment. A non-self-executing treaty effectively delegates the task of giving treaty obligations domestic content and effect to another set of federal actors: Congress and the President. Similarly, statutes regularly
effect a range of delegations. 49 Statutes cited in Foster and Percheman
delegated to a board of commissioners the task of identifying land
claims to be presented to Congress for confirmation. 0 The law at issue in Curtiss-Wright," another foreign affairs watershed, delegated to
the President the decision to criminalize all or some arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay during the Chaco War.5 2 Congress routinely delegates to the executive the opportunity to define the domestic effect of
laws by enacting regulations and to decide when to prosecute violations of the law, profoundly affecting the law's domestic application.
Granted, many of these delegations are explicit. But they are not invariably so, and implicit delegations may trigger separation of powers
judgments about whether courts or agencies should take the lead in
exercising lawmaking authority.§ As a result, a doctrine that allows
treaties to delegate decisions regarding domestic implementation, even
implicitly, is on some level unexceptional.
Third, all four doctrines of non-self-execution, including the Foster
brand, appear to be part of an organic whole; each doctrine is
grounded in separation of powers concerns and employs separation of
powers-based presumptions to guide the self-execution analysis. The
private right of action doctrine, for example, reflects the separation of
powers judgment that "a decision to create a private right of action is
one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases,"
involving as it does not merely the decision whether "primary conduct
should be allowed" but, for example, whether "to permit enforcement
without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion."#4 As a result,
49 Even congressional-executive agreements may be non-self-executing, effectively reserving
domestic implementation for a later date by the same or a subsequent Congress. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 447.
5o See, e.g., United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89-95 (1833).
s1 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (936).
52 See id. at 312-13.

53 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(noting that Congress may implicitly leave statutory gaps for an administering agency to fill and
that courts must not substitute their own judgment for reasonable judgments by the agency).
54 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
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"the background presumption is that '[i]nternational agreements, even
those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic
courts."'
The nonjusticiability doctrine similarly rests on the recognition
that lawmaking discretion of a certain scale generally belongs to the
political branches.16 But this is not a hard and fast rule. Constitutional and statutory lawmakers may authorize courts to give content
to vague standards, but a treaty likely will not indicate whether
the treatymakers intended to do so. The nonjusticiability doctrine imposes a presumption, motivated by a particular vision of separation
of lawmaking powers, that treatymakers do not intend to grant that
authority.
The Foster doctrine employs similar presumptions. The doctrine
asks whether U.S. treatymakers intended to require congressional implementation. If there is evidence of a subjective intent to eschew immediate judicial enforcement, the doctrine, based again on separation
of lawmaking and foreign affairs powers, respects that intent. In this
sense, the Foster doctrine is the corollary of the nonjusticiability doctrine. Nonjusticiability ensures that the political branches exercise
lawmaking discretion; the Foster doctrine respects the way in which
that discretion is exercised. At the same time, the treatymakers may
not have been clear as to whether they intended self-execution or not.
As VAzquez and the Medellin dissent point out, in negotiating a treaty
the executive may not have or take the opportunity to address domestic implementation."7 The Foster doctrine, like the other doctrines,
employs certain presumptions that ensure that courts do not hastily fill
this void with a conclusion of self-execution." These presumptions for example, the judgment that a treaty is more likely non-selfexecuting if a finding of self-execution would effect troubling consequences" - again arise from recognition of political branch primacy
in foreign affairs and lawmaking.
The constitutionality doctrine is likewise based on separation of
powers concerns. At first glance, it appears that the doctrine is based
on the explicit assignment of powers to specific actors within the political branches, while the other three doctrines arise from the assign5s

Medellin v. Texas,

128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n-3 (2008)

(alteration in original) (quoting

STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES

2 RE-

§ 907

cmt. a (1986)).
56 See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 715.

57 See sources cited supra note 38.
58 In particular, such considerations are evident in the nonjusticiability doctrine, which Vazquez endorses. As a result, even if one reads Medellin as Vazquez prefers, as a manifestation of
the nonjusticiability doctrine, Medellin still provides support for the Foster doctrine.
59 See, e.g., Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1364.
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ment of lawmaking and foreign affairs authority to the political
branches rather than the courts. 60 From another angle, however, the
constitutionality doctrine is, like its companion doctrines, based on the
separation of powers between the political branches and the courts as
evidenced by the fact that courts do not strike as unconstitutional a
treaty that assumes obligations other political actors must fulfill. Rather, the courts designate the treaty as non-self-executing, effectively
presuming that the political branches did not intend for the treaty to
be immediately effective and respecting the limits on the judiciary's
ability to compel domestic lawmaking. 6 1
Despite VAzquez's contention that the Foster doctrine is different
from other versions because it has its source in the treaty rather than
the Constitution, it appears that the Foster doctrine is grounded, like
the others, in a particular separation of powers vision and that it employs the same sort of separation of powers-based presumptions. 62
One might attempt to distinguish the Foster doctrine by arguing that it
permits treatymakers to intentionally avoid judicial enforcement without an explicit indication of non-self-execution, but as indicated above,
other doctrines do that as well. All this reflects that the Foster doctrine is an unexceptional part of the non-self-execution doctrine.6 3
IV. MEDELLIN V. TEXAS

The Supreme Court provided further support for Foster non-selfexecution in its landmark decision in Medellin. VAzquez offers several
readings of Medellin and settles on Medellin as a nonjusticiability opinion consistent with a Supremacy Clause-based presumption of selfexecution. 64 A different reading of Medellin, however, undermines
each component of VAzquez's dismissal of the Foster doctrine.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Medellin reflect the debate
over whether the issue of non-self-execution is primarily governed by
60 See Vazquez, Four Doctrines,supra note 8, at 718.

61 See Vazquez, supra note 3, at 649.
62 Vazquez asserts that the constitutionality and nonjusticiability doctrines, in particular, "flow
from the Constitution's allocation of powers among the branches of the federal government." Id.
at 630.
63 If there is one manifestation of the doctrine that differs sufficiently from the rest to warrant
severance, it is not the Foster doctrine but the private right of action doctrine. The private right
of action doctrine presents a question that is subsequent to the question whether the treaty is enforceable in U.S. courts, focusing on whether it is enforceable by the particular plaintiff in the
absence of an independent state or federal cause of action. See id. at 629-30; Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719-22. Relatedly, that doctrine has a more limited effect, preventing only
enforcement by the plaintiff and not judicial enforcement of the treaty through other routes such
as in defense to a criminal prosecution. See id. As a result, if one quarter of the self-execution
doctrine should be severed, it is the private right of action doctrine.
64 See Vazquez, supra note 3, 602.

44

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

122.32

the Supremacy Clause's designation of treaties as law of the land or by
the constitutional delegation of lawmaking and foreign affairs authority to the lawmakers of the land. Like VAzquez, the dissent emphasized the role of the Supremacy Clause in the self-execution question.
The dissent opened by quoting the Supremacy Clause,6s defined the
question presented as "whether the Supremacy Clause requires
Texas . . . to enforce[ the] ICJ judgment," 66 and reasoned "that the Supremacy Clause itself answers the self-execution question by applying
many, but not all, treaty provisions directly to the States."67
The majority, by contrast, did not focus on the Supremacy Clause68
and endorsed the view that non-self-execution derives from the authority to make treaties. In defending its reliance on the treaty's text, the
majority argued that the political branches, not the courts, should have
"the primary role in deciding when and how international agreements
will be enforced."6 9 And although it cited various considerations that
guided its self-execution analysis, the majority ultimately concluded
that "[n]othing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or
Senate intended the improbable result of giving judgments of an international tribunal" preemptive effect over state procedural rules that
apply even to constitutional rights.70 Reflected in this reasoning is the
notion that the treatymakers are authorized to enter something less
than a self-executing treaty and that the judiciary's role is to determine
whether they have done so.
In so concluding, the majority did not treat Foster as an aberration
that was corrected in Percheman. The Court relied heavily on Foster
and cited Percheman as subsequent history that overruled Foster in
65 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1375 (2008) (Breyer,
66 Id. at 1377.

J., dissenting).

67 Id. at 1380; see also id. at 1377-81, 1383, 1384-85, 1389.
68 This omission - understandable given the majority's focus on the treatymakers' authority
- leads Vazquez to conclude that the majority "ignore[d] the constitutional text." Vazquez, supra
note 3, at 649.
69 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1363; see also id. at 1364 (reasoning that if it is unlikely the political
branches would authorize enforcement of all JCJ decisions, including politically sensitive ones, the
political branches, not the courts, should decide which judgments to enforce).
7o Id. at 1367 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1356 (stating that a treaty is self-executing when
"the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms"
(emphasis added) (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3 d 145, 150 (ist Cir. 2005)
(en banc)); id. at 1358 (pointing out that the language of the U.N. Charter does not "indicate that
the [consenting] Senate ... intended to vest JCJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic
courts"); id. at 1362 (justifying reliance on treaty text on the grounds that the text is "negotiated
by the President" and is "what the Senate looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty"); id.
at 1364 ("[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that the
President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect."); id. at 1366 ("Our cases
simply require courts to decide whether a treaty's terms reflect a determination by the President
who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.").
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part but did not call into question Foster's explanation of the distinction between non-self-executing and self-executing treaties or even
Foster's assessment of the English text of the treaty at issue." Further, the factors the majority considered in conducting its selfexecution analysis reflect the same sort of separation of powers judgments involved in Foster and Percheman.

The Court searched for the treatymakers' subjective intent in observance of the treatymakers' primary control over lawmaking and
foreign affairs. But the search for intent, difficult as it was, was also
guided by separation of powers judgments. Thus, in addition to relying on the enforcement mechanisms contemplated under the U.N.
Charter to discern the treatymakers' actual intent,'2 the Court reasoned that where the treatymakers crafted international, and ultimately contingent, political means of enforcement, a finding of selfexecution would infringe on both the discretion the political branches
had retained to decide "whether and how to comply" and the political
branches' broader foreign affairs authority. 3 Similarly, since no other
signatory treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts, the
Court presumed that the U.S. treatymakers did not unilaterally assume
a greater obligation notwithstanding the fact that the Supremacy
Clause would allow them to do so.7 4 And the Court considered the
consequences of treating ICJ judgments as unassailable federal law as
too dramatic to presume that the treatymakers intended that result.1
The majority thus tethered non-self-execution to the treatymakers' authority and founded its self-execution analysis on separation of powers
judgments reminiscent of Foster and Percheman.
The dissent was likewise unwilling to conclude that the Supremacy
Clause mandates automatic enforcement of all treaties, acknowledging
some authority in the treatymakers to assume non-self-executing obligations.7 6 Consistent with this concession, the dissent likewise endorsed the use of separation of powers presumptions to guide the selfexecution analysis. The dissent noted that the self-execution considerations endorsed by Supreme Court precedent seek to identify matters
"more clearly the responsibility of other branches."" The subject matter of a treaty, for example, is "of particular importance" as treaties de71

See id. at 1356, 1358, 1362; Vazquez, supra note 3, at 646.

72 See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1359-6o.
73 Id. at 1360; cf Vazquez, supra note 3, at 663 (arguing that to the extent a treaty leaves
discretion to decide whether and how to comply it would be "non-self-executing because
nonjusticiable").
74 See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1363; cf id. at 1361 (giving the Executive Branch's interpretation of the pertinent treaties great weight).
75 See id. at 1364.

76 See id. at 1380 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1364 (majority opinion).
77 Id. at 1383 (Breyer,

J., dissenting);

see also id. at 1382-83, 1385, 1388-89, 1392.
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claring war or proclaiming peace would address the political
branches.'
Treaties that do not "set forth definite standards that
judges can readily enforce" similarly more likely address the political
branches. 9 The broader Court thus accepts a role for the separation
of powers considerations that feature in the Foster doctrine.s0
Whether any given separation of powers presumption is appropriate is fertile ground for debate going forward.8 ' Consistent with his
argument that the Constitution, statutes, and treaties should receive
equal treatment, Vazquez effectively accepts the presumption that a
treaty is non-self-executing if it contains vague obligations. Should
courts similarly presume that a treaty is non-self-executing if it effects
significant changes in U.S. law? If other states do not assume a selfexecuting obligation? If the treaty contemplates other means of enforcement? If judicial enforcement threatens negative foreign relations
effects or constricts political branch foreign policy discretion? These
questions exceed the scope of this essay, but at a minimum raise the
puzzle of why the Foster doctrine, with its separation of powers judgments, ought to fail if the presumption behind the nonjusticiability
doctrine survives.
The use of separation of powers presumptions raises two additional
issues. Such presumptions may effectively create a general presumption against self-execution. While the Court did not expressly adopt a
presumption against self-execution, the separation of powers presumptions employed in Medellin make it more likely that courts will find
treaties to be non-self-executing when the treatymakers do not expressly indicate otherwise. This makes the question of the constitutionality of declarations of self-execution all the more important.8 2
Medellin's grounding in the authority of the treatymakers coupled
with its recognition that treaty obligations have a dual international
and domestic character 3 provide support for the validity of declara78 Id. at 1382; see also id. at 1388 (indicating that judgments "touching upon military hostilities, naval activity, handling of nuclear material, and so forth" are "better suited for enforcement
by" branches other than the judiciary).
79 Id. at 1382; see also id. at 138S, 1388.
80 Moreover, the majority suggested that if any quarter of the non-self-execution doctrine
ought to be severed it is the private right of action doctrine. The majority defined the term "selfexecuting" to exclude that doctrine and noted that the doctrine applies after the self-execution decision has been made and is subject to an express presumption against recognition of private
rights of action. See id. at 1357 n.3 (majority opinion).
81 Among other things, one might question whether certain separation of powers presumptions
improperly infringe on the treatymakers' authority by, for example, forcing treatymakers to be
more explicit regarding treaties' domestic effect than treatymakers would prefer.
82 See Vazquez, supra note 3, at 671, 690.
83 See supra note 48; see also Vazquez, supra note 3, at 648 (noting that a superseded or unconstitutional treaty will remain binding internationally even though it does not qualify as domestic law).

2009]

LAW(MAKERS)

OF THE LAND

47

tions of both non-self-execution and self-execution (though the final
resolution of that question is beyond the reach of this essay). At a
minimum, such declarations provide strong evidence of the intent of
the treatymakers inasmuch as declarations, unlike legislative history,
only survive if they reflect the united intent of the President and twothirds of the Senate.
Second, as the decisions in Foster and Percheman illustrate, the
separation of powers presumptions that inform self-execution analysis
could lead to a conclusion that a treaty is self-executing in one situation but not in another.8 4 The Medellin Court resisted such a result.,
If, as the Medellin Court intimated, treaties have a fixed character,
that character may depend on the context in which the question of a
treaty's self-executing character first arises. The treatymakers might
avoid this problem by attaching declarations of non-self-execution or
self-execution. Of course, forcing treatymakers to do so may hamper
their foreign affairs discretion.
VAzquez respects treatymakers' authority to the extent he acknowledges their power to create some non-self-executing treaties, but his rejection of the Foster brand of non-self-execution constricts both that
authority and the political branches' broader foreign affairs and lawmaking discretion. VAzquez's position is undercut by the Constitution,
precedent, the similarity of other manifestations of the non-selfexecution doctrine, and the Supreme Court's most recent application
of non-self-execution.
All these combine to sustain a non-selfexecution doctrine grounded in separation of powers judgments that
seek to respect the political branches' primacy in lawmaking and foreign affairs. So understood, the Foster brand of non-self-execution
may be more "confounding" 6 than VAzquez's clear statement reading
of Foster, but it is more consistent with the scope and allocation of the
authority of the lawmakers of the land.

84 Cf Vazquez, supra note 3, at 656-57.
85 See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1362 (criticizing the dissent's approach as meaning that "the

same treaty sometimes gives rise to United States law and sometimes does not, . . depending on
an ad hoc judicial assessment").
86 Vazquez, supra note 3, at 6o n.5 (quoting United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 8 76( 5 th Cir.

1979)).

